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ABSTRACT
Congestion control algorithms seek to optimally utilize network re-
sources by allocating a certain rate for each user. However, mali-
cious clients can disregard the congestion control algorithms and
induce congestion at bottleneck links. Thus, in an adversarial en-
vironment, the network must enforce the congestion control algo-
rithm in order to attain the optimal network utilization offered by
the algorithm.
Prior work protects only a single link incident on the enforce-
ment router, neglecting damage inﬂicted upon other downstream
links. We present CRAFT, a capability-based scheme to secure all
downstream links of a deploying router. Our basic approach is to
enforce a network-wide congestion control algorithm on all ﬂows.
As a reference design, we develop techniques to enforce the TCP
congestion control. Our design regulates all ﬂows to share band-
width resources in a TCP-fair manner by emulating the TCP state
machine in a CRAFT router. As a result, once a ﬂow passes a sin-
gle CRAFT router, it is TCP-fair on all downstream links of that
router. Our prototype implementation shows that CRAFT provides
strong fairness properties with low overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
Congestion control algorithms seek to optimally utilize network
resources by allocating a certain rate for each user. The optimal
utilization is often deﬁned using some fairness metric, including
max-min fairness and proportional fairness [15]. Researchers have
extensively studied the congestion control problem, including end-
to-end approach [1], router-assisted approach [12], adaptive stud-
ies to diverse network environment [3, 10], and theoretical stud-
ies [15, 19]. While most work in congestion control assumes that
all entities follow the rules speciﬁed by a congestion control algo-
rithm, some work has also considered an adversarial environment
where a misbehaving user does not follow the speciﬁed rule [22,
23], thereby gaining network resource allocation that exceeds his
fair share or suppressing the network resource allocated to others.
Some work adopts a reactive approach to defend against misbe-
having users. Floyd et al. [11] use a TCP throughput equation to
determine the proper throughput for a ﬂow and categorize any ﬂow
using more than its fair throughput as “not TCP friendly”. Sto-
ica et al. [26] estimate the rate of a ﬂow and assign that ﬂow a fair
share of a link according to the estimated rate. In contrast to the
protocols proposed by Floyd et al. and Stoica et al., fair queue-
ing [7] is a preventive approach where a router allocates a ﬁxed
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Figure 1: An example that illustrates single-link protection is insufﬁcient
for protecting downstream links.
amount of bandwidth to a ﬂow or the aggregate of several ﬂows
when that router experiences congestion.
While these studies have desirable properties in some contexts,
they are all single-link schemes. That is, a router deploying any of
the proposed defense mechanisms can protect only the link imme-
diately behind that router. Consequently, a single-link congestion
control scheme must be deployed at each network bottleneck. If
the network topology is complex and dynamic, a single-link con-
gestion control scheme may require universal deployment in order
to protect the entire network from misbehavior.
We now illustrate how a single-link protection mechanism is not
sufﬁcient to enforce fair sharing of throughput throughout the en-
tire network. Figure 1 shows a network in which all links have
the same link capacity. Let there be a ﬂow that traverses multi-
ple links together with different number of ﬂows at each link. The
bandwidth-fair rate of a ﬂow traversing a link is simply the band-
width of the link divided by the number of ﬂows sharing the link. In
this example network, ﬂow FA and N other ﬂows traverse router
RD,1 that deploys a single-link protection mechanism, enforcing
that each ﬂow gets 1
N+1
of the link capacity. That is, FA shares
link L2 with N other ﬂows in a bandwidth-fair manner. Suppose
FA’s destination is different from that of the other N ﬂows; then
FA, but not any of the N other ﬂows, would traverse the legacy
router RL,2. If 2N other ﬂows also traverse through the router
RL,2, FA could obtain roughly twice as much bandwidth as each
of the other 2N ﬂows could.
In this paper, we consider network-wide protection against a mis-
behaving ﬂow. That is, a router deploying a defense mechanism can
protect all its downstream links (regardless of the number of hops
between the router and the link) from a misbehaving ﬂow after the
ﬂow traverses the router. A network-wide protection scheme is de-
sirable in networks where full-deployment of a defense mechanism
is difﬁcult or costly. Intuitively, a router cannot protect the net-
work from ﬂows the router has not seen; therefore, protecting all
its downstream links provides optimal protection achievable by a
router.
We present CRAFT (Capability-based Regulation of All Flows
and Trafﬁc), a secure congestion control architecture that provides
network-wide protection. Our basic approach is to enforce that all
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ﬂows follow a speciﬁed congestion control algorithm. We let a
CRAFT router drop packets of a misbehaving ﬂow so that the ﬂow
competes fairly with other ﬂows in the downstream links of the
router. Our contributions are:
• We show that our approach is realizable by designing the en-
forcement of TCP, the most widely deployed congestion con-
trol algorithm in the Internet.
• We design CRAFT to provide security while remaining efﬁ-
cient in terms of router and end-host computation and storage.
• We implement CRAFT to show that our design is practical and
deployable.
We start our paper with our problem statement.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1 Goal and Basic Approach
In this paper, we present a secure protocol that provides network-
wide protection. After a ﬂow that claims to comply with our proto-
col traverses a single deploying router, that ﬂow would fairly share
all downstream links with other legitimate and legacy TCP traf-
ﬁc. Our proposed protocol achieves this network-wide protection
property by emulating the state machine of each ﬂow and enforc-
ing that each ﬂow follows a speciﬁed congestion control algorithm.
We will consider the overhead of emulating the state of each ﬂow
in our design. We believe it is crucial to investigate network-wide
protocols so that deployment cost is not prohibitive for the system
operators in funding-constrained networks. To make our discussion
concrete, we design our protocol to emulate the TCP state machine
and enforce TCP-fairness.
2.2 Design Consideration
To efﬁciently and practically emulate the TCP state machine, we
list several crucial design considerations in this section. We also
brieﬂy cover how our proposed protocol deals with these design
considerations.
• Fairness: There can be various deﬁnitions of fairness. In this
paper, we are most concerned with a network-wide protocol,
we thus consider a fair rate to be the rate that is obtainable by a
legitimate TCP ﬂow since TCP is the predominant congestion
control protocol used in the Internet today.
• Minimal trust: If a router trusts any entity besides itself to
behave correctly, an attacker can compromise the trusted en-
tity and attack the services provided by that router. To provide
the strongest security, we assume that a CRAFT router trusts
only other routers in the same autonomous system (AS) as it-
self. Speciﬁcally, a CRAFT router does not use information
provided by any router outside its AS, the sender, or the re-
ceiver to bootstrap security.
• Asymmetric route: Generally, the Internet path of a given
ﬂow is not symmetric [13]. Hence, we assume that, although
a downstream packet goes through a particular CRAFT router,
the corresponding upstream packet (acknowledgment) might
not go through the same CRAFT router.
• Minimal per-ﬂow state at routers Since a router only has
limited amount of memory, a router must minimize the amount
of per-ﬂow state stored in order to service the maximum num-
ber of ﬂows. Our protocol uses pre-capability to lessen the
per-ﬂow state stored at a router.
• Packet reordering or loss: In the Internet, packets can be re-
ordered or lost. Identifying packet reordering or loss is im-
portant for emulating the TCP state of a ﬂow since packet
reordering and loss affect a benign TCP receiver’s acknowl-
edgment behavior thereby affecting the rate of a benign TCP
ﬂow. Our proposed CRAFT header allows a router to identify
packet reorderings and losses similar to a TCP client.
• Other transport layer protocols: We use TCP fairness as
our deﬁnition for fair congestion control. Applications use
UDP for various purposes, e.g. to avoid retransmissions, to
avoid rate control in the event of packet losses, and to reduce
the transport-layer overhead of each packet. Nonetheless, in a
network that seeks to prevent denial-of-service attacks, a ﬂow
must be subjected to congestion control. Therefore, in our
design, non-TCP ﬂows are rate-limited to the TCP-fair rate.
• Various ﬂavors of TCP: Since the TCP standard leaves much
room for interpretation, many TCP variants are used in the In-
ternet today. One way to deal with different ﬂavors of TCP is
to have each ﬂow specify the TCP variant used in the packet
header and try to emulate that TCP variant. The other way
is to emulate the most aggressive TCP that is still acceptable.
In this paper, we enforce an upper bound of the TCP conges-
tion window that is compliant to RFC 2581. We discuss the
issues involved in supporting speciﬁc ﬂavors of TCP in Ap-
pendix C.1.
2.3 Threat Model
We design our protocol to treat the above design considerations
under a strong attacker model. We make no assumptions about
whether the routers or end hosts are compromised; in particular,
we do not prevent compromised end hosts from colluding. A com-
promised end host or router can send packets at any arbitrary rate,
eavesdrop, modify, and drop any packets that are generated by or
routed through them.
3. STRAWMAN DESIGN
To better understand CRAFT, we present a ‘strawman’ design to
securely emulate the TCP state of a ﬂow before we present our pro-
tocol. We let a ﬂow be deﬁned as a 4-tuple: source IP, source port,
destination IP, and destination port. Our strawman design illustrates
a method that emulates the TCP congestion control protocol [1]
with high overhead in an idealized environment where all pack-
ets reach the destination in order, and the path of the ﬂow might
be asymmetric but does not change over the lifetime of the ﬂow.
We provide careful treatment on how CRAFT relaxes these limi-
tations in Section 4. Detailed explanation of the TCP congestion
control [1,24] is beyond the scope of this paper, and is summarized
in Appendix A.
The TCP congestion control assumes that a pair of sender and
receiver would behave in a manner speciﬁed in the protocol; specif-
ically, the sender would increase the rate of the ﬂow only when the
the receiver honestly acknowledges receiving a packet. However,
in an adversarial environment, a sender can arbitrarily increase its
rate without having received any acknowledgments. Furthermore,
a receiver can send acknowledgments without actually having re-
ceived a packet [22] since acknowledgments in the TCP are not
cryptographically dependent on the data in the TCP packet.
Our strawman design illustrates how we can prevent a TCP ﬂow
from misbehaving. For simplicity, we present our proposed straw-
man and CRAFT protocols as each would operate when data ﬂows
in only one direction, even though our protocol designs, simulation,
and implementation extend readily to bidirectional ﬂows.
Intuition. The main objective of our strawman design is to ensure
that a downstream packet is indeed received by a receiver and the
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Figure 2: Strawman design: a strawman router generates a Random Value
(Ri) corresponding to a Packet ID (i) and stores the Random Value. Af-
ter the receiver gets the Random Value, the receiver forwards the Random
Value to the sender. In a future packet, the sender includes the received Ran-
dom Value with the data. When the packet reaches the strawman router, the
router compares the received Random Value to the stored Random Value,
thereby ensuring that the previous packet and its acknowledgment were suc-
cessfully received by the receiver and the sender, respectively.
corresponding acknowledgment is received by a sender. A straw-
man router can generate a Random Value for each packet to verify
that the receiver has received a downstream packet, that the receiver
has sent the Random Value back to the sender in its acknowledg-
ment packet, and that the sender has received the corresponding
acknowledgment, as shown in Figure 2.
When the strawman router sees a downstream packet, it inserts
a Random Value into the packet, routes the packet to the receiver,
and stores the Random Value and its associated ﬂow in its memory.
The receiver, upon receiving the packet, sends the Random Value
back to the sender along with the TCP acknowledgment. The next
time the sender wishes to send a packet to the receiver, the sender
includes in the packet the Random Value he received that was em-
bedded in the acknowledgment of the previous packet.
Since we assumed that the path from the sender to the receiver
does not change, the data packet including the Random Value will
reach the strawman router. The strawman router then veriﬁes that
the Random Value included in the packet is the same as that stored
in the router. Since the Random Value is generated by the straw-
man router, a matching pair of Random Values in the packet and in
the router’s local memory implies that the previous packet was suc-
cessfully received and acknowledged. In other words, the receiver
and the sender collaboratively acknowledge to the router that the
Random Value and the packets therein were successfully received.
This architecture addresses the minimal trust consideration in
Section 2.2 since a strawman router is required to trust only it-
self. Our strawman design also addresses the asymmetry of Internet
path consideration since our strawman router does not require the
upstream packets or the acknowledgment packets to traverse the
same strawman router that the downstream packet traversed. Our
CRAFT protocol preserves these properties.
Detailed description. Algorithm 1 shows the packet header struc-
ture and how the sender, receiver, and a strawman router behave in
our strawman design. When a sender wants to send a new packet
over a particular ﬂow, it assigns a unique Packet ID to each packet.
The sender includes the following data with the packet header: the
Packet ID, the latest received Random Value, and the correspond-
ing Random Value ID. The Random Value ID is the Packet ID of a
packet for which a strawman router previously generated a Random
Value.
When a packet arrives at a strawman router, the router veriﬁes
that the included Random Value is valid. That is, the router com-
pares the included Random Value with that stored locally at the
router. If the value included in the packet matches that stored
locally, the router calculates the new congestion window (cwnd)
size for the corresponding ﬂow. We explain this function (cal-
culate_new_window_size()) in more detail in Section 4.4. The
Algorithm 1 Strawman version
Packet header from sender: <Packet ID (pid), Random Value ID (rid), Random
Value (Rrid)>
On strawman router’s receiving a packet
r ← stored_random_value(rid)
if r == Rrid then
calculate_new_window_size()
Rpid ← generate_new_random_value(pid)
stored_random_value(pid)← (Rpid)
insert_random_value_to_packet(Rpid)
else
drop packet
end if
Packet header from router: <Packet ID (pid), Random Value (Rpid)>
On receiver’s sending a packet
insert_random_value_to_packet(Rpid)
On sender’s sending a packet
insert_random_value_to_packet(Rpid)
insert_new_packet_ID_to_packet(pid+ 1)
router then generates a new Random Value and replaces the Ran-
domValue included in the packet. The strawman router then locally
stores this new Random Value and Packet ID and routes the packet
to its destination. If the value included in the packet is different
from that stored locally, the router punishes the corresponding ﬂow
by dropping the packet or deleting the entire ﬂow state.
The receiver, upon receiving a packet, forwards the received Packet
ID and the Random Value to the sender. The Packet ID and the
Random Value can simply piggyback on the acknowledgment.
When the sender receives the acknowledgment and the Random
Value associated with a particular Packet ID, the sender can use
the Packet ID, the associated Random Value, and the congestion
control protocol to send more packets.
Our strawman design allows a strawman router to securely ver-
ify that a receiver only acknowledges packets that are successfully
received, and a sender only sends more packets if the sender has
received acknowledgments of previous packets.
We now discuss two undesirable properties of our strawman de-
sign. A strawman router needs to store a Random Value for each
outstanding packet so that when an outstanding packet is acknowl-
edged, the router can verify the included Random Value and up-
date the emulated congestion window. Consequently, as the TCP
congestion window size of each ﬂow grows over time, a strawman
router may need to store a large amount of Random Values.
Our strawman design also does not gracefully handle delayed
acknowledgments. In general, a receiver generates one delayed ac-
knowledgment for every other received packets. However, since
our strawman packet header only includes one Random Value, a
strawman router cannot distinguish between a ﬂow that has no packet
losses from a ﬂow that loses every other data packet. A simple
modiﬁcation to handle delayed ack is to include multiple Random
Values in the packet header. However, this method increases the
size of the packet header.
Both of the mentioned undesirable properties are results of using
independent Random Values for each outstanding packet. If a later
Random Value depends on a previous Random Value, then a router
only needs to verify the latest Random Value to implicitly verify
all previous Random Values. We thus introduce the concepts of
pre-capability and capability in the next section.
4. CRAFT DESIGN
In this section, we present how CRAFT relaxes the limitations
of our strawman design to efﬁciently emulate the TCP state of each
ﬂow in the real Internet environment. Our speciﬁc target version of
TCP is based on the standard documentation [1], which is summa-
rized in Appendix A. There are many variants of the standard TCP;
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Figure 3: Capability-based enforcement of TCP congestion control algo-
rithm. A CRAFT router generates a pre-capability (Pf,i) for a packet (i) of
a ﬂow (f ). After the receiver gets the pre-capability, the receiver calculates
and forwards a new capability (Cf,i) to the sender. The sender includes
received capability to the CRAFT router in a future packet.
however, we do not focus on compliance of any particular variant,
but instead, on providing techniques to efﬁciently handle reorder-
ing and loss. Since we design CRAFT without any speciﬁc TCP
variants in mind, CRAFT emulates the congestion window (cwnd)
of a ﬂow using the maximum allowed cwnd based on the standard.
Usually, TCP variants differ only in the management of cwnd in re-
sponse to packet losses. Thus, by properly modifying our proposed
techniques in emulating the cwnd, CRAFT can be readily adapted
for speciﬁc subsets of TCP variants.
4.1 Overview
CRAFT operates similarly to our strawman design, we illustrate
CRAFT in Figure 3. The main difference between CRAFT and our
strawman design is that CRAFT uses pre-capability and capability
instead of a Random Value to verify that a packet and its acknowl-
edgment are received by the receiver and the sender respectively.
We design pre-capability and capability so they can gracefully han-
dle reordering and loss in a memory space-efﬁcient manner. We
explain the detailed construction of pre-capability and capability
in Section 4.2. Algorithm 2 shows the packet header of CRAFT
packets and the whole procedure of CRAFT after a connection is
established. We explain each ﬁeld in the packet header when we
explain its associated operations.
When a sender initiates a CRAFT ﬂow, it sends a CRAFT request
packet, and the router allocates some of its memory to store the
state of the new ﬂow. When the ﬂow initiation packet reaches the
receiver, the receiver allocates some memory for the new ﬂow, and
sends an acknowledgment to the sender to ﬁnish the connection
establishment. Establishing a connection can be done by using the
TCP SYN and SYN-ACK packets.
Once a sender establishes a connection, the sender assigns each
of his outgoing packets with a unique and contiguous integer, called
the Packet ID. The CRAFT Packet ID is different from a TCP se-
quence number since the TCP sequence number is issued based on
the byte number, while the CRAFT Packet ID is issued based on
the packet number.
For each packet routed through a CRAFT router, the router veri-
ﬁes that the TCP cwnd of the corresponding ﬂow allows the ﬂow to
send that packet. The CRAFT router uses the ACK ID and the ca-
pability in the packet header to update a ﬂow’s cwnd. If a packet is
sent exceeding the ﬂow’s cwnd, the packet is dropped. Otherwise,
the CRAFT router generates a pre-capability for the packet, inserts
the pre-capability in place of the capability in the packet header,
and then route the packet to its destination. We explain how a
CRAFT router can verify capabilities and generate pre-capabilities
in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3. We then explain how a CRAFT
router updates the emulated cwnd of a ﬂow in Section 4.4.
Algorithm 2 CRAFT
Packet header from sender: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid), Capability (C),
Timeout (TO), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs (lids)>
On CRAFT router’s receiving a packet
if check_duplicate_packetID(pid) then
drop packet
end if
c← calculate_capability(ackid, rids, lids) (Section 4.2 and Section 4.3)
if c == C then
calculate_new_window_size() (Section 4.4)
if is_packet_acceptable() then
P ← calculate_pre-capability(pid) (Section 4.2)
insert_pre-capability_to_packet(P )
else
drop packet
end if
else
drop packet
end if
Packet header from router: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid), Pre-capability
(P ), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs (lids)>
On receiver’s receiving a packet
C ← calculate_capability() (Section 4.2 and Section 4.3)
store_capability(C)
Packet header from receiver: <Packet ID (pid), ACK ID (ackid), Capability
(C), Reordered Packet IDs (rids), Lost Packet IDs (lids)>
On receiver’s sending a packet
insert_capability_to_packet(C)
On sender’s receiving a packet
store_capability(C)
On sender’s sending a packet
insert_capability_to_packet(C)
insert_new_packet_ID_to_packet(pid+ 1)
To reduce the network trafﬁc, a CRAFT router can use the Packet
ID of a packet to remove duplicate packets similar to how IPSec
detects duplicates. For each ﬂow, a CRAFT router keeps a list of
the Packet IDs of a number of the ﬂow’s most recent packets. If the
Packet ID of a packet indicates that the packet is a duplicate, the
CRAFT router discards the packet.
4.2 Pre-capability and Capability
In this section, we present how a CRAFT router generates the
pre-capability associated with a packet and veriﬁes the capability
in the packet header. Speciﬁcally, we show how pre-capability and
capability reduce the memory space overhead while preserving the
security features of our strawman design.
In order to clearly present CRAFT, we do not consider any packet
reordering or loss in this section. In case a packet is reordered or
lost, our construction of pre-capability and capability remains un-
changed, only the router’s capability veriﬁcation mechanism is al-
tered. We explain how to handle reordering and loss in Section 4.3.
Intuition. The inefﬁcient use of memory space and the difﬁculty
of handling delayed ack in our strawman design result from the
fact that a Random Value inserted into a packet is unrelated to
that packet’s Packet ID and any previously inserted Random Val-
ues. We thus let a CRAFT router insert into each packet a secret
pre-capability, which is calculated using the Packet ID. We then
deﬁne the capability of a ﬂow to be an aggregate of all the past
pre-capabilities inserted into its packets. Both the CRAFT router
and the receiver of the ﬂow can calculate the capability since the
CRAFT router can generate all the pre-capabilities, and the receiver
can store all the seen pre-capabilities.
Since the pre-capability of a packet is calculated using the Packet
ID, a CRAFT router should not store all previous pre-capabilities
issued to a ﬂow in order to conserve the limited memory space of a
router. However, without the router storing the pre-capabilities, we
must not let the sender and receiver of a ﬂow be able to generate the
pre-capabilities before a packet is sent. Otherwise the sender and
the receiver can collaboratively defeat the veriﬁcation mechanism
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shown in our strawman design. CRAFT provides unpredictability
by using computationally efﬁcient keyed MAC (Message Authen-
tication Code).
As shown in Figure 3, a CRAFT router generates a pre-capability
(Pf,i) when a new packet comes in. A pre-capability is generated
by using a cryptographically secure hash function g:
Pf,i = g(K, f, i),
where K is the secret key of the CRAFT router, f is the ﬂow ID,
and i is the Packet ID. Flow ID is a large and unique value ran-
domly generated by the router when the ﬂow is created. If g is a
hash function in the Random Oracle Model [4], then Pf,i is indis-
tinguishable from a random number because the pair (f, i) has not
been previously seen. SinceK is known to only the CRAFT router,
it is computationally inefﬁcient to guess Pf,i.
We further elaborate on the g function with a telescoping con-
struction:
g(K, f, i) = EK(f ||i)⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1)
where EK represents a computationally efﬁcient keyed MAC such
as HMAC [16] and || is the concatenation operator. By choos-
ing EK as a secure pseudo-random function, it follows that Pf,i
is also indistinguishable from a random number. The telescoping
construction enables the CRAFT router to calculate a capability
corresponding to a set of contiguous pre-capabilities in constant
time.
When the receiver receives a packet (i) with a pre-capability
(Pf,i), the receiver constructs the capability (Cf,i) associated with
the packet. A capability (Cf,i) is deﬁned to be the exclusive-or of
all received pre-capabilities up to i. If there is no reordering or loss,
Cf,i = Pf,0 ⊕ . . .⊕ Pf,i,
By using the exclusive-or function, we can take advantage of a de-
sirable property: if any input and its distribution are unknown, the
output is uniformly distributed over the domain, yielding the largest
uncertainty and secrecy in the information theoretic sense. More-
over, since Pf,i = EK(f ||i)⊕EK(f ||i+1), the capability can be
calculated efﬁciently using
Cf,i = EK(f ||0)⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1).
Hence, we need only a single xor operation to calculate the capa-
bility associated with a set of contiguous pre-capabilities.
When the receiver sends an acknowledgment to the sender, the
receiver inserts the received Packet ID i and the corresponding ca-
pability Cf,i in the acknowledgment. We call this Packet ID the
ACK ID. ACK ID is deﬁned to be the Packet ID of the latest con-
tiguous packet that a receiver is acknowledging, subject to any pre-
vious disclosed losses. A received Packet ID is contiguous as long
as there is no packet reordering or loss. We provide careful treat-
ment when considering packet reorders and losses in Section 4.3,
and the term ‘disclosed loss’ will become clear.
When the sender sends a new packet, the new Packet ID will be
i+ 1. The sender then inserts ACK ID i and capability Cf,i in the
new packet. When the CRAFT router gets the new packet from the
sender, it can calculate capability Cf,i corresponding to ACK ID i
and ﬂow ID f :
Cf,i = EK(f ||0)⊕ EK(f ||i+ 1).
This operation requires only two hash operations and one xor op-
eration. If a CRAFT router stores Cf,i−1 and ACK ID i as shown
in Figure 4(b), the router only needs to perform one hash operation
and one xor operation at the expense of using memory space to
Packet ID Random Value
Packet ID Random Value
For all outstanding packets
Lid Lrandom
(a) Strawman design
Key
ACK ID Capability
Lid Lrandom
(b) CRAFT
Figure 4: Comparison of router memory usage between strawman design
and CRAFT for a ﬂow: Lid and Lrandom are reference length for com-
parison
store data. The ACK ID and capability are necessary for handling
reordering or loss.
We compare the memory space used by our strawman design and
the CRAFT protocol in Figure 4. We exclude variables related to
emulating TCP state since both designs require the same amount
of memory space for these variables. For each ﬂow our strawman
router keeps the Packet IDs and the associated Random Values for
all outstanding packets. On the other hand, for each ﬂow, a CRAFT
router keeps only a secret key, the ACK ID, and the capability re-
gardless of the number of outstanding packets. This property re-
sults from the fact that a CRAFT router can calculate the capability
with the Packet ID included in the packet header. For handling de-
layed ack, it is important to note that Cf,i proves that the receiver
has successfully received not only packet i but also all the packets
up to i. Hence, the receiver can acknowledge two packets at once
(Packet ID i and i+1), and the sender can subsequently prove so to
the router, by using only one capability Cf,i+1. This accumulative
property of capability enables CRAFT to use the minimal number
of capabilities to handle delayed acks.
4.3 Handling Reordering and Loss
Intuition. As long as all packets are successfully received in or-
der, a CRAFT router can easily verify a capability by calculating
Cf,i = EK(f ||0)⊕EK(f ||i+1). However, if packets are lost, the
receiver cannot learn the pre-capability of the lost packets, and the
receiver thus cannot construct the capability. In this scenario, the
receiver computes the capability by excluding the pre-capabilities
associated with the lost packets, the receiver also discloses in the
acknowledgment packet header the packet IDs of the lost pack-
ets. The CRAFT router then excludes the pre-capabilities of the
lost packets when calculating and verifying the received capability.
CRAFT follows the standard TCP where a packet that is out-of-
order by too much is considered lost.
Detailed description. CRAFT uses the header ﬁelds of Reordered
Packet IDs and Lost Packet IDs (shown in Algorithm 2) to han-
dle packet reordering and loss. Reordered Packet IDs are a list
of non-contiguous packet IDs that a receiver receives out of order.
Lost Packet IDs are a list of Packet IDs that a receiver has not re-
ceived. For example, consider the case that a sender has received
acknowledgments for packets 0 through i, and packet i+ 1 is lost.
When a receiver receives packet i+2, the receiver considers packet
i + 2 as a reordered packet and sends an immediate (not delayed)
acknowledgment which contains in its packet header ACK ID of
i and Reordered Packet IDs of i + 2. This is similar to a partial
acknowledgment, which is a modiﬁed duplicate acknowledgment
issued by the TCP congestion control. The acknowledgment for
packet i+ 3 then contains ACK ID of i and Reordered Packet IDs
of {i+ 2, i+ 3}. When packet i+ 4 arrives at the receiver, the re-
ceiver issues a third duplicate acknowledgment and concludes that
packet ID i + 1 is lost [1]. This third duplicate acknowledgment
contains ACK ID of i+ 4 and Lost Packet ID of i+ 1.
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When a receiver sends an acknowledgment, the receiver inserts
a capability as deﬁned in Section 4.2. For the acknowledgment of
ACK ID i and Reordered Packet IDs {i+ 2, i+ 3}, the capability
is
C = Cf,i ⊕ Pf,i+2 ⊕ Pf,i+3.
For the acknowledgment of ACK ID i+4 and Lost Packet ID i+1,
the capability is
C = Cf,i ⊕ Pf,i+2 ⊕ Pf,i+3 ⊕ Pf,i+4.
After the sender receives the acknowledgments containing the
ﬁelds of Reordered Packet IDs or Lost Packet IDs, the sender’s
new packet simply carries these ﬁelds with the received capability
to the CRAFT router. One might think that the number of these
ﬁelds becomes larger over time as more packets are lost. However,
since TCP concludes that a packet is lost if three duplicate acknowl-
edgments are issued, at most two Reordered Packet IDs need to be
included in a CRAFT packet header. Moreover, since the CRAFT
stores the ACK ID and the corresponding capability of a ﬂow, when
a receiver receives a packet, the receiver no longer needs to include
any Lost Packet IDs that are smaller than the ACK ID in the packet.
In the previous example where packet i+1 is lost, when the receiver
receives a packet with ACK ID i+ 4, the receiver does not need to
include i+1 in the ﬁeld of Lost Packet IDs. Additionally, if a block
of contiguous packets are lost, a receiver can specify the interval of
Lost Packet IDs rather than individual Lost Packet IDs to reduce
the length of the packet header.
We present how a CRAFT router veriﬁes the capability of a
packet when previous packets are reordered or lost. When the Re-
ordered Packet IDs ﬁeld in the header of a packet is not empty, a
CRAFT router simply veriﬁes that the included capability matches
the capability up to the ACK ID included in the packet header xor
the pre-capabilities of the reordered packets.
If the Reordered Packet IDs and Lost Packet IDs ﬁelds in the
header of a packet are not empty, a CRAFT router calculates the ca-
pability of a packet in the following manner. If the router has stored
ACK ID i and the corresponding capability C, and the new packet
indicates ACK ID j > i, Lost Packet IDs L = {1, 2, . . . , n},
Reordered Packet IDs r1 and r2 and capability C′, then C′ is valid
if and only if
C′ = C ⊕ Pf,r1 ⊕ Pf,r2
⊕
{x∈([i+1,j]\L)}
Pf,x;
that is, when we xor C with the pre-capabilities of the reordered
packets and with the pre-capabilities between i + 1 and j that are
not associated with a lost packet, the result should be the new ca-
pability1. If C′ is valid, we update the (ACK ID, capability) pair
stored at the router to (j, C′).
In our previous example, when packet with ACK ID i + 4 and
Lost Packet ID i+ 1 reaches the CRAFT router, the router veriﬁes
that the included capability equalsCf,i⊕Pf,i+2⊕Pf,i+3⊕Pf,i+4.
If so, the new capability is consistent with the last valid capability
xor the pre-capabilities between the last valid capability and the
current capability, and the CRAFT router updates the stored ACK
ID and the capability.
1Since x⊕ x = 0, we can efﬁciently calculate
⊕
x∈([i+1,j]\L)
Pf,x = EK(f ||i+1)⊕EK(f ||j+1)
⊕
x∈([i+1,j]∩L)
Pf,x
4.4 Congestion Window Calculation
When a CRAFT router veriﬁes a new capability, it knows that
one or more additional packets have been received and acknowl-
edged by the receiver, so the router updates its emulated cwnd ac-
cordingly.
Like a TCP sender, a CRAFT router stores the cwnd, the slow
start threshold (ssthresh), and the maximum segment size of each
ﬂow in its memory. The sender discloses the maximum segment
size (mss) at connection initialization, and whenever the mss changes.
The CRAFT router updates this variable in a manner consistent
with the behavior of a legitimate TCP sender-receiver pair. The
cwnd and ssthresh are initialized to some predeﬁned values sug-
gested by the TCP congestion control.
The CRAFT router can distinguish between acknowledgments
generated from contiguous packets and those generated due to out-
of-order delivery by examining the ACK ID and the Reordered
Packet IDs. If a sequence of packets are acknowledged in order, the
CRAFT router emulates a sender that has received one acknowl-
edgment for every packet he sends. This represents the maximum
number of acknowledgments the TCP standard allows the receiver
to send. Though a unidirectional TCP ﬂow might use delayed ac-
knowledgments, i.e. sending only one acknowledgment for every
other received packets, a bidirectional TCP ﬂow opportunistically
carries acknowledgments on reverse trafﬁc, allowing the possibility
of sending one acknowledgment per packet. Since the cwnd grows
faster when the sender sends more acknowledgment, we choose
to emulate the cwnd by assuming one-ACK-per-packet in order to
form a reasonable upper bound of the cwnd.
When a CRAFT router observes any Reordered Packet IDs, the
router concludes that at least one packet is out-of-order. The router
does not adjust the emulated cwnd until the router sees advance-
ment in the ACK ID with either none or a number of Lost Packet
IDs. When the CRAFT router sees a Lost Packet ID, the emu-
lated state enters fast recovery phase. The CRAFT router reduces
the ssthresh to the maximum of half of the amount of outstanding
packets or two times the mss and sets the emulated cwnd to the new
ssthresh plus 3 mss to take into consideration the three duplicate
acknowledgments. The CRAFT router considers the ﬁrst packet
with disclosed packet loss as a retransmitted packet and records
that packet’s Packet ID. When the CRAFT router sees an ACK ID
with increment of 1 during fast recovery phase, it increases cwnd
by 1 mss to keep the same number of outstanding packets. When
the CRAFT router sees a packet with an ACK ID equal to or larger
than the recorded ID of the retransmission packet, the emulated
state exits from fast recovery phase and the CRAFT router sets the
emulated cwnd to ssthresh.
Under some circumstances, a TCP sender might lose a packet
and not recover through the fast retransmission mechanism. In
these cases, after a certain period of time, the sender should time
out, and set the timeout (TO) ﬁeld of the next packet header to 1 to
reﬂect recovering from a timeout in CRAFT. A CRAFT router that
sees a packet with the timeout bit of its packet header set to 1 then
accepts the ACK ID and any capability borne with this packet (to
reduce the burden of listing all Lost Packet IDs), resets the cwnd
to one packet, and halves the ssthresh in accordance with the TCP
congestion control.
4.5 Remaining Details
When CRAFT is deployed over multi-AS (Autonomous Sys-
tem) environment, a CRAFT router in an AS might not trust an-
other CRAFT router in another AS. CRAFT thus uses a separate
set of pre-capabilities and capabilities in the packet header for each
CRAFT router. To accommodate multiple capabilities, CRAFT can
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use short capability that is each a few bits in length. We discuss the
security of using short capability in Section 5.1.
When a network wants to deploy CRAFT with support for legacy
trafﬁc, a CRAFT router may allocate a certain amount of band-
width to legacy trafﬁc depending on its admission control policy,
so clients that have not deployed CRAFT can still have access to
network service. Since a user can increase his legacy trafﬁc rate ar-
bitrarily, a CRAFT router, in response, can use fair queuing to limit
the bandwidth allocated to legacy trafﬁc.
Let us deﬁne the CRAFT path of a ﬂow to be the set and order of
CRAFT routers traversed by the CRAFT ﬂow. If the network path
used by a CRAFT ﬂow changes, the ﬂow would traverse either the
same CRAFT path or a different CRAFT path. If the ﬂow traverses
the same CRAFT path as the original ﬂow, each CRAFT router
can still update the TCP state emulation, and the ﬂow can continue
operating as if the route had not changed. If the ﬂow traverses a
different CRAFT path, there is at least one new CRAFT router that
cannot verify the CRAFT packet header due to lack of knowledge
or out-of-order ﬁelds in the header. That CRAFT router would then
treat the packet as legacy trafﬁc, and send a reset message to the
corresponding sender of the ﬂow. The sender can then re-initiate a
new CRAFT ﬂow to the destination.
5. POTENTIALATTACKSANDDEFENSES
In this section, we discuss several possible attacks on the ba-
sic design of CRAFT as explained in Section 4. We also propose
mechanisms to defend against each attack.
5.1 Capability Forgery Attack
The size of capability affects the security and the overhead of the
CRAFT system. To reduce the system overhead, we can use a short
capability; for example, in our implementation of CRAFT, the short
capabilities are 3-bit in length. When CRAFT uses short capabili-
ties, an attacker can attempt to guess the capability of a packet by
initiating a ﬂow and ﬂood the path with random capabilities. Since
without a CRAFT router’s key, the capability appears uniformly
randomly, 1/(23) = 1/8 of the attacker’s guesses are expected to
be accepted by the ﬁrst CRAFT router on the path. If there are n
deploying CRAFT router on the path between the attacker and the
bottleneck link, then 1/(23n) = 1/(8n) of the packets are expected
to enter the bottleneck link.
In the initial phase of deployment, CRAFT routers may be only
sparsely deployed, and there might not be enough CRAFT routers
on the path to prevent the attacker from exhausting the bottleneck
link bandwidth. For example, if only one CRAFT router is de-
ployed between an attacker and the bottleneck link, the attacker
can deny service by sending trafﬁc at 8-times the bandwidth of the
bottleneck link.
We thus propose that when a CRAFT router receives an exces-
sive number of incorrect capabilities from a particular ﬂow, the
CRAFT router should notify the sender to switch to using long ca-
pabilities instead of the 3-bit short capabilities. We choose this
approach rather than penalizing the ﬂow to prevent an attack where
the attacker alters the capability of a packet of a legitimate ﬂow,
thereby harming the performance of the benign ﬂow.
When using long capabilities, such as those 32-bits long, the
probability of guessing a valid capability is vanishingly small, and
an attacker that tries to guess random capabilities will have its band-
width reduced by a factor of 232 at each legitimate CRAFT router.
To switch between short capability and long capability, CRAFT
packet header includes a one-bit ﬁeld so that a sender and CRAFT
routers can agree on using short or long capability.
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Figure 5: Generation of a hash chain
5.2 Packet ID Spooﬁng Attack
As mentioned in Section 4.1, a CRAFT router removes duplicate
packets within a single ﬂow that share the same Packet ID. Thus, an
attacker that forges a packet with Packet ID p could cause a CRAFT
router to drop the actual packet bearing Packet ID p.
To defend against this attack, we use a hash chain to authenticate
the Packet ID. A hash chain consists of a series of hash values gen-
erated by a cryptographic hash function [25]. A cryptographic hash
function takes a message of arbitrary length as input, and computes
a ﬁxed-length output, called a message digest. A hash function is
preimage-resistant if given h = H(m), it is computationally in-
feasible to obtain m.
To generate a hash chain of length N , the sender chooses two
nonces, r and hN and generates the chain by feeding back the
output of a preimage-resistant hash function as the input. That is,
hi−1 = H(r||hi), where || denotes concatenation. Figure 5 illus-
trates how to generate a hash chain of length N . The nonce r is
used to avoid reusing a hash value from previous ﬂows.
To allow each CRAFT router to authenticate Packet IDs, a sender
includes in its CRAFT connection initiation packet the values of r
and h0. Each CRAFT router stores the values r and h0 to authenti-
cate future hash values. When the sender sends packet with Packet
IDm, the packet includes the hash value hm in the hash ﬁeld of the
CRAFT header.
When a CRAFT router receives a new packet, it can authenticate
the Packet ID by traversing the hash chain. For example, when the
CRAFT router receives Packet ID 1 with hash element h′, it will
verify that H(r||h′) = h0, and if so, the CRAFT router will know
that h1 = h′. Since the cryptographic hash function is preimage-
resistant, it is computationally infeasible for other users to generate
hi from hi−1.
5.3 Memory Exhaustion Attack
Since a CRAFT router needs to maintain some state in mem-
ory for each ﬂow, an attacker can attempt to exhaust the memory
space of the router by establishing an excessive number of ﬂows.
CRAFT uses Portcullis [21] to mitigate this attack by allocating a
per-computation-fair share of the available number of connections
among all requesting end hosts.
A CRAFT router can also dynamically adjust the difﬁculty of the
computation puzzle as a function of the amount of its free memory.
Speciﬁcally, when the memory of a CRAFT router is mostly un-
used, the router uses easier computation puzzle to encourage more
ﬂows to use CRAFT; when the router’s memory becomes low, the
router uses more difﬁcult computation puzzle to mitigate potential
memory exhaustion attack.
An attacker can also attempt to exhaust the memory space of
each packet. In each CRAFT packet header, a limited memory
space is allocated for pre-capabilities. Thus, if an attacker ﬁlls
that limited memory space with fake pre-capabilities, no CRAFT
router can monitor the ﬂow since no CRAFT router can insert its
pre-capabilities into the packet header.
Since CRAFT router cannot verify that packets are received and
acknowledged according to the TCP standard, a CRAFT router
mitigates the packet header memory exhaustion attack by assign-
ing ﬂows with insufﬁcient packet header memory to use the legacy
portion of the link controlled by the CRAFT router.
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Figure 7: Fairness as evaluated by implementation. A single UDP ﬂow,
controlled by CRAFT, competes against 1–5 legacy TCP ﬂows.
5.4 Imperfections in TCP Feedback
Because TCP congestion control measures the cwnd according
to bytes acknowledged and not the total number of bytes outstand-
ing, and because packet sizes can vary, an attacker could exploit
these differences to temporarily overwhelm a link protected by CRAFT.
For example, after an attacker acquires a sizable cwnd, he can send
multiple 1-byte packets, each of which comes with its own IP and
CRAFT header. An attacker can thus easily ﬂood the network with
trafﬁc that is magnitudes larger than allowed by his cwnd. Many
researchers have documented the effectiveness of using small pay-
load to disrupt network service [23].
If an attacker sends multiple small-sized messages without chang-
ing his maximum segment size, we can easily stop the attack by
enforcing Nagle’s algorithm [20]. If an attacker sends multiple
small-sized messages by changing his maximum segment size, then
CRAFT defends against this attack by maintaining the maximum
amount of outstanding data-plus-header. Due to space constraints,
we detail our defense mechanism against this attack in Appendix B.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the overhead, the effectiveness, and
the security of CRAFT.
6.1 Experiment Methodology
Our testbed consists of a small network in our lab which is con-
nected over the Internet to Emulab [9], a public open network testbed.
We illustrate our testbed in Figure 6. The small access network in
our lab consists of two senders connected to one router, which is in
turn connected to the Internet. The receiver in Emulab is also con-
nected to the Internet. Each of our two senders sends TCP or UDP
data to the receiver in Emulab over the Internet. We placed the In-
ternet between the senders and the receiver in order to experiment
with realistic cross-trafﬁc and queuing delay. The link bandwidth
between the senders and the router is 100 Mbps, and we vary the
receiver’s access link from 10 Mbps to 100 Mbps.
We implemented CRAFT between network layer and transport
layer in Linux kernel version 2.6.20, including header insertion,
processing, and extraction steps at the senders, the router, and the
receiver. Our prototype CRAFT implementation uses 32-bit packet
IDs, thus Packet ID, ACK ID, Reordered Packet ID, and Lost Packet
ID in Algorithm 2 are all 32-bit long. Each Pre-Capability and Ca-
pability in our implementation is 3-bit long, and the timeout (TO)
ﬂag is 1-bit long.
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Figure 8: CRAFT packet overhead results
6.2 Fairness Measured by Implementation
We ﬁrst examine how a CRAFT-compliant UDP ﬂow shares band-
width with other TCP ﬂows. We let A be a group of TCP senders;
and B, a single UDP sender with 10 Mbps source rate. We then let
each sender in A send packets to a receiver using TCP Reno; and
let B send packets using CRAFT. That is, B generates a 10 Mbps
UDP trafﬁc, but only transmits data at a CRAFT-compliant rate.
All ﬂows from A and B converge at a CRAFT router before en-
tering the Internet and eventually reach the destination as shown in
Figure 6. We implemented a user-level program to send CRAFT
acknowledgments in the reverse direction in order to make a unidi-
rectional UDP ﬂow compatible with CRAFT.
We measure the throughput of B’s CRAFT-compliant ﬂow and
the aggregate throughput of A’s TCP ﬂows while varying the num-
ber of TCP ﬂows at A from 1 to 5. Figure 7 shows our results. The
thin solid line represents the bandwidth that each ﬂow would get if
all ﬂows enjoy the same portion of link bandwidth. The bold solid
line shows the throughput of B, the CRAFT-compliant UDP ﬂow.
We observe that the CRAFT-compliant ﬂow enjoys 20% to 55%
higher throughput than its fair share.
The difference between CRAFT-compliant rate and the fair share
can be attributed to TCP ﬂows using delayed acknowledgments.
The TCP standard recommends sending one acknowledgment for
every other received packets as long as the packets meet some tim-
ing criteria. However, CRAFT limits ﬂow rates using the maximum
TCP rate, and since the TCP cwnd grows faster when the receiver
acknowledges each packet instead of every other packet, CRAFT
does not use delayed acknowledgments, thereby allowing a ﬂow to
gain higher throughput than the fair share.
6.3 Overhead Measured by Implementation
To enforce TCP congestion control to each ﬂow, CRAFT incurs
two types of overhead: packet header overhead and processing
overhead. The packet header overhead decreases the amount of
goodput with a given maximum segment size (mss) and the pro-
cessing overhead increases the time a router takes to forward a
packet.
Packet header overhead. A CRAFT ﬂow stores several extra in-
formation in the packet header, thus reducing the maximum amount
of data sent in each packet with a given mss. The reduced goodput
can be calculated theoretically as
(mss− ηCRAFT)
mss
× goodputoriginal
where ηCRAFT is the size of the CRAFT header and goodputoriginal
is the goodput of a ﬂow without CRAFT deployment. Since the
size of CRAFT header varies due to various optional ﬁelds, such as
Reordered Packet IDs and Lost Packet IDs, we do not calculate a
theoretic packet overhead, but instead determine it experimentally.
To determine the impact of the packet header overhead, we con-
sider a TCP sender sending trafﬁc through the Internet and Emulab
to the receiver. We then compare the goodput of the TCP ﬂowwhen
8
Table 1: Processing times for router functions
Function Processing time
Creation of a new ﬂow 3120ns
Lookup of ﬂow 30ns
Calculation of hash 1720ns
Veriﬁcation of capability 300ns
Update of cwnd 170ns
Calculation of pre-capability 610ns
1ms
1ms
1ms
1ms
Attacker
R3
Bottleneck 
link
R5R4
1ms
1ms
1ms
R6
R7
Normal 
flow 
sources A
Normal 
flow 
sources B
Flow 
sinks
R1
R2
Figure 9: Simulation topology
CRAFT is in use to that of a normal TCP ﬂow. We vary the access
link bandwidth between 10 Mbps and 100 Mbps, and perform 5
runs for every data point. Figure 8 shows the mean TCP goodput
for each access link rate and the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the av-
erage. These results show that the legacy TCP ﬂow provides 2.03%
to 15.33% higher goodput than that of CRAFT.
When the access link bandwidth is under 60Mbps, the difference
between the goodputs of the two ﬂows is not signiﬁcant. We ob-
serve the biggest difference between goodputs when the access link
bandwidth is 90 Mbps. The goodputs of both CRAFT and normal
TCP levels off when the access link bandwidth is between 60 to
90 Mbps, we believe that this leveling behavior is caused by trafﬁc
shaping somewhere outside of our control and is irrelevant to the
CRAFT overhead.
Processing overhead. Upon receiving a CRAFT packet, a CRAFT
router performs several operations: looking up the ﬂow, checking
the validity of the hash, verifying the capability, updating the con-
gestion window, and generating a new pre-capability. We use a
single core of a 3 GHz Xeon process to measure the processing
times required by our implementation of these functions. In par-
ticular, we use SHA256 to generate and verify the hash chain, and
use RC5 to generate pre-capabilities. Table 1 shows the measured
processing time for each functional block.
Our results show that a single core of a Xeon processor can han-
dle over 300,000 packets per second. At a minimum packet size of
a 20 byte IP header and 28 byte CRAFT header, this represents a
bandwidth exceeding 14.4 Mbps. At a more realistic packet size of
1500 bytes, this represents 450 Mbps. Thus low bandwidth routers
can use a slow processor since the processing requirement is low,
and a high-bandwidth router can implement these functions on a
FPGA or ASIC to process even more quickly than the Xeon CPU.
These numbers are for our particular implementation of CRAFT,
and might be improved in future implementations. Our measured
processing times thus serve as a lower bound for CRAFT perfor-
mance.
6.4 Simulation Methodology
We perform a simulation study to evaluate the effectiveness of
CRAFT in providing network-wide fairness compared to other single-
link protection schemes. For this comparative study, we use ns-2
simulation rather than our prototype implementation to easily im-
plement other schemes and to modify experimental settings. We
compare CRAFT against fair queueing and the ﬂow rate estimation
protocol proposed by Stoica et al. [26]. The fair queueing scheme
provides a max-min allocation [5] of link bandwidth to ﬂows. The
ﬂow rate estimation scheme calculates the time-average rate of each
ﬂow. When a ﬂow rate is greater than its max-min fair share by a
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Figure 10: Comparison of fairness in terms of average window size (Attack
trafﬁc rate=10 Mbps)
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Figure 11: Comparison of fairness in terms of attack strength (Average
window size=40)
threshold, the protocol ﬂags the ﬂow for violation. Figure 9 shows
our simulation topology. Attack ﬂow and normal ﬂows in group A
traverse a deployed router (R1). For normal ﬂows in group B, we
examine both cases where R2 is a deploying and non-deploying
router. There is one bottleneck link that all ﬂows share in the net-
work. The bottleneck link is not protected by any defense mecha-
nism and has link bandwidth 100 Mbps. There is one attacker ﬂow
which sends a CBR (Constant Bit Rate) trafﬁc. Each group of nor-
mal ﬂows contains 20 ﬂows, and all normal ﬂows use TCP Reno.
In our network topology, each TCP ﬂow experiences the same link
delays. Since the RTT heavily affects the TCP throughput, we ex-
pect the average throughput of all TCP ﬂows to be similar to each
other. We measure the throughput of each ﬂow by calculating a
weighted time-average. We then calculate the Raj Jain fairness in-
dex [14]. The fairness index equation is given by (
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
n
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
where
n is the total number of ﬂows and xi is the throughput of ﬂow i.
The fairness index is less than or equal to 1 with equality if and
only if all ﬂows have the same throughput.
We examine the fairness provided by CRAFT, fair queueing, and
ﬂow rate estimation using two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, we
examine the fairness with respect to the average window size. We
deﬁne window to be the number of outstanding packets (packets
that are sent but not yet acknowledged). Since the maximum num-
ber of outstanding packets is related to the bandwidth-delay product
(BDP), we calculate the average window size to be BDP
Sp×n , where
Sp is the packet size and n is the total number of ﬂows. To vary the
BDP , we adjust the delay of the bottleneck link.
In the second scenario, we examine the fairness with respect to
the constant bit rate (CBR) of the misbehaving ﬂow. In each sce-
nario, for each data point, we run 10 simulations and calculate the
95% conﬁdence interval.
6.5 Simulation Results
Figure 10 compares the fairness in throughputs provided by CRAFT,
fair queueing, and ﬂow rate estimation with respect to various av-
erage window size. We let the attack trafﬁc rate be 10 Mbps, which
is a small fraction of the bottleneck link bandwidth (100 Mbps).
The ﬁgure shows that CRAFT slightly outperforms other schemes
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for every average window size we test. Since queue build-up hap-
pens only at the bottleneck link, the deployed routers in our tested
topology do not use up the bandwidth of its immediate link. Conse-
quently, the deployed routers do not observe congestion and cannot
effectively enforce fairness. This fact results in the same fairness
index for fair queueing and ﬂow rate estimation.
Figure 11 compares the fairness in throughputs provided by CRAFT,
fair queueing, and ﬂow rate estimation with respect to the trafﬁc
rate of the attacker. Since the benign TCP-compliant ﬂows com-
pete against the malicious trafﬁc, as the rate of the attacker trafﬁc
approaches the bottleneck link bandwidth, the benign ﬂows would
obtain lower throughput in the networks using fair queueing and
ﬂow rate estimation, resulting in lower Raj Jain fairness index.
However, since CRAFT enforces that the attacker trafﬁc compete
with other ﬂows in a TCP-fair manner, the Raj Jain fairness index
is not signiﬁcantly reduced.
In both scenarios, whether R2 is deployed or not does not af-
fect the resulting fairness. Moreover, CRAFT is shown to be more
effective in enforcing TCP fairness in both scenarios.
6.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that a CRAFT router can limit all ﬂows
beyond the router to share network bandwidth in a TCP-fair man-
ner when using short capability. TCP-fairness can be formally de-
ﬁned by a utility function in an optimization-based framework [18];
however, we deﬁne TCP-fairness loosely to be the behavior of the
network when all ﬂows adhere to the TCP congestion control spec-
iﬁcations.
We ﬁrst show that, when a CRAFT router is using short capabil-
ity, the rate of any given ﬂow beyond that CRAFT router must be
limited by the CRAFT rate, which is deﬁned to be the rate allocated
by CRAFT to a ﬂow given a loss pattern in a network. We then ar-
gue that the CRAFT rate is TCP-fair. That is, a CRAFT ﬂow must
adhere to the TCP congestion control algorithm.
To show that the rate of a ﬂow is limited by the CRAFT rate,
we observe that a CRAFT router disregards all packets with invalid
capabilities. That is, if a ﬂow wishes to increase its rate above the
CRAFT rate, it needs to send more capabilities than it receives.
However, an attacker cannot consistently predict future acknowl-
edgments, and too many erroneous attempts will cause the CRAFT
router to force the attacker to switch to using long capabilities, thus
further reducing the success rate of guessing. Moreover, since the
rate can only monotonically decrease as the ﬂow traverses more
CRAFT routers, a single CRAFT router (namely the closest one to
the sender) is able to limit the ﬂow rate below CRAFT rate.
When a CRAFT ﬂow uses long capability, an attacker could po-
tentially argue that someone else is trying to spoof the capability,
thereby evading any penalties and CRAFT rate limit. However,
with a 32-bit long capability, only one in 232 excess packets carries
a valid capability. To put this in perspective, an attacker ﬂooding
an OC-768 link at line-speed can only squeeze 9.3 bps past the ﬁrst
CRAFT router. Each additional CRAFT router provides a further
reduction in bandwidth.
We now argue that CRAFT ﬂows and regular TCP ﬂows could
share a link with TCP-fairness on a legacy link. It is immediately
obvious that a TCP ﬂowwould share the link with a CRAFT ﬂow in
a TCP-fair manner. That is, without considering what the CRAFT
ﬂow does, the TCP ﬂow adheres to TCP congestion control. In the
other direction, without considering the TCP ﬂow, the CRAFT ﬂow
is limited by its CRAFT rate, which is in turn determined using the
TCP congestion control standard. That is, the CRAFT ﬂow must
also be TCP-fair. Therefore, CRAFT ﬂows and other TCP ﬂows
are able to share a legacy link in a TCP-fair manner.
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we overview related work on monitoring misbe-
having ﬂow, misbehaving TCP receiver and capability-based sys-
tems.
Monitoringmisbehaving ﬂow. Floyd et al. [11] use a TCP through-
put equation to determine the proper throughput of a ﬂow. They
then propose punishing a ﬂow that uses higher throughput than that
calculated throughput. A basic assumption of their work is that a
sender does not cheat on parameters in the TCP throughput equa-
tion. However, an attacker can break this assumption. For example,
the TCP throughput is reversely proportional to the round trip time.
Hence, an attacker can intentionally delay its packets so that the
attacker can enlarge the throughput calculated by the router. This
problem originates from the weak trust model of their method. Sto-
ica et al. [26] estimate the rate of a ﬂow and use the estimated rate
to distribute fair share of a link. Unlike the approach proposed by
Floyd et al., the approach proposed by Stoica et al. does not place
any trust in a sender. However, due to the statistical nature of esti-
mating a rate, false detection can occur and a short but heavy ﬂow
can greedily occupy a portion of bandwidth temporarily.
Misbehaving TCP receiver. Ely et al. [8] use a random nonce to
defend against a receiver selﬁshly exploiting ECN. Savage et al.
[22] considered a misbehaving TCP receiver that acknowledges
several pieces of a received packet (ACK division), acknowledges
one received packet several times (dup-ACK spooﬁng), or acknowl-
edges future packets in advance (opt-ACK). Savage et al. proposed
a modiﬁed TCP protocol to defend against untrusted receiver’s mis-
behavior. Sherwood et al. [23] demonstrated that a misbehaving
TCP opt-ACK receiver together with a small maximum-segment-
size can induce the sender to inject a large amount of data into the
network. These works assume that a sender is benign and trusted.
Our work assumes that both of the sender and the receiver of a ﬂow
can be colluding attackers.
Capability-based systems. Capability-based systems enable re-
ceivers to select which sender can send trafﬁc to them. Ander-
son et al. suggest capabilities to defend against bandwidth ex-
haustion attacks [2]. Yaar et al. proposed the SIFF protocol [28],
and Yang et al. proposed the TVA protocol [29] that are con-
crete designs of capability-based DoS defense systems. Liu et al.
compared the performance of various capability-based systems and
ﬁlter-based systems [17]. Parno et al. proposed the Portcullis proto-
col based on computation puzzles. By prioritizing service requests
based on the computational power of the clients, Portcullis can pre-
vent an attacker from ﬂooding links with connection initialization
packets to exhaust the capability request channel [21]. CRAFT can
be considered as a capability-based mechanism to secure conges-
tion control protocols.
8. CONCLUSION
We have presented the CRAFT protocol to provide a high level
of security against misbehaving users, by enforcing TCP-fairness
on all ﬂows that have traversed a CRAFT router. The central goal
of CRAFT is to achieve a system where a CRAFT-enabled router
can prevent a ﬂow from causing unfairness on any downstream link,
even if the link is surrounded by legacy routers.
A single CRAFT router can protect all links behind it; thus CRAFT
can be deployed with little cost. Our experiments show that CRAFT
enforces TCP fairness while incurring little overhead in packet header
size and computation time. Our simulations show that in realis-
tic partial-deployment environments, CRAFT can provide superior
fairness than previously suggested mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
A. BACKGROUND ON TCP
In this section, we introduce some concepts and acronyms re-
lated to TCP. The purpose of this section is not to explain all the
details of TCP but to brieﬂy introduce the main concepts of TCP
congestion control. Readers who would like more details on TCP
can refer to the literatures [1, 24]. The details provided in this sec-
tion are based on standard [1].
In TCP, each byte is given a contiguous sequence number for
each direction of a TCP connection. Each packet contains the se-
quence number of the ﬁrst byte contained in that packet, as well as
an acknowledgement number, which represents the sequence num-
ber of the last contiguously received byte for the opposite-direction
trafﬁc.
TCP congestion control treats the network as a black box, ob-
serving the end-to-end delay and loss characteristics and choosing
a data sending rate compatible with all intermediate links. The
main goal of the TCP congestion control is to estimate the avail-
able network bandwidth and adjust the offered load accordingly.
A TCP sender adjusts its offered load by changing its congestion
window (cwnd), which represents the maximum number of unac-
knowledged data bytes that the sender releases into the network at
a time.
When an acknowledgment packet reaches the sender, the sender
increases its cwnd. There are two operation phases in which a
sender increases its cwnd: slow start and congestion avoidance.
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In the slow start phase, a TCP sender increases its cwnd rapidly
since it assumes that a network is much under-utilized. When the
sender’s cwnd reaches a threshold (ssthresh), it enters the con-
gestion avoidance phase. In the congestion avoidance phase, a
TCP sender assumes that the network is close to being congested.
Hence, the sender increases its cwnd slower than the sender would
in the slow start phase.
If the increased cwnd caused the network to be congested, pack-
ets will be lost in the congested links in the network. TCP de-
tects the congestion through packet losss, and in turn, detect packet
losses by using duplicate acknowledgments. When a packet is lost,
the receiver reacts to an unacknowledged out-of-order packet (that
is, one with sequence number greater than the next contiguous se-
quence number) by sending a duplicate acknowledgment, which
has the same acknowledgment number as the previous acknowledg-
ment packet. When the sender receives a third duplicate acknowl-
edgment, it concludes the packet after the acknowledged packet to
have been lost, and retransmits that packet in a process known as
fast retransmit. Once the retransmitted packet is acknowledged, the
sender goes through fast recovery by halving the size of its cwnd,
and setting the ssthresh to the new cwnd, and then the sender enters
congestion avoidance again. When a large number of packets are
lost at once, a sender may not receive any duplicate acks. In this
case, the sender times out, reset its cwnd and ssthresh, and starts
from the slow start phase again.
B. IMPERFECTIONS IN TCP FEEDBACK
In Section 5.4, we noted an attack where the attacker changes his
packet size and use packet header to amplify his attack trafﬁc. In
order to avoid such an attack, CRAFT enforces certain protocols
that TCP does not require. Namely, CRAFT enforces Nagle’s al-
gorithm [20]; that is, a CRAFT router allows each ﬂow to have one
outstanding packet that is of size less than the maximum segment
size. By enforcing Nagle’s algorithm, we can prevent an attacker
from sending multiple small sized packets.
When an application needs to send a large number of small pack-
ets, it may decide to reduce its maximum segment size for a pe-
riod of time. In CRAFT, the sender notiﬁes all routers each time
it changes the maximum segment size. When a node increases its
maximum segment size, the cwnd can remain unchanged, because
the total number of bytes that can be sent for a given cwnd de-
creases as the maximum segment size increases. This is because as
the maximum segment size increases, the number of packets that
can be sent for a given cwnd decreases, thus the amount of over-
head associated with those packets also decreases.
Conversely, when decreasing the maximum segment size, the
amount of bandwidth associated with a given cwnd increases. If
we allow the sender to decrease its maximum segment size without
also decreasing its cwnd, then the attacker can temporarily send at
a rate much greater than its fair rate. Thus, when a node decreases
its maximum segment size, we adjust its cwnd to ensure that its old
maximum data-plus-header in ﬂight is equal to its new maximum
data-plus-header in ﬂight, by satisfying the expression
cwndold + η
cwndold
SMSSold
= cwndnew + η
cwndnew
SMSSnew
,
where SMSS is the sender’s maximum segment size, and η is the
size of the overhead, including the TCP header and the CRAFT
header.
C. DISCUSSION
C.1 Various ﬂavors of TCP
As introduced in Section 2.2, we handle various ﬂavors of TCP
by emulating the TCP congestion control speciﬁed in RFC 2581 [1]
and increase the emulated cwnd in the most aggressive manner.
Several congestion controls and bandwidth allocation mechanisms
do not follow the TCP congestion control stated in RFC 2581. As
such, current version of CRAFT cannot accurately emulate the state
of these ﬂows and might not support ﬂows using these congestion
control algorithms. These TCP variants behave differently from
RFC 2581 in two respects: congestion determination and window
evolution. For example, TCP Vegas [6] uses increase in measured
delay as a sign of congestion instead of the triple duplicate ac-
knowledgments used by RFC 2581. Also, BIC TCP [27] updates
the congestion window differently from the protocol speciﬁed in
RFC 2581. Though these variants are not currently supported by
CRAFT, as long as these variants are still TCP-friendly, future ver-
sions of CRAFT could allow for user selection of multiple state-
tracking strategies.
C.2 Deployment Model
Routers. We have shown in Section 6.6 that a CRAFT router can
protect all downstream links from upstream trafﬁc. That is, a net-
work provider can protect all its internal links from outsiders by
upgrading only its border routers. Moreover, if a service provider
trusts one of its neighbors less than others, the service provider can
ﬁrst deploy CRAFT at the border router with the neighbor that is
less trusted. A provider needs not deploy CRAFT at all routers
at once; instead, a provider can slowly phase out its legacy links.
CRAFT thus allows a provider to avoid both expensive one-time
cost and complicated simultaneous deployment.
End-Hosts. Moreover, the service provider can lessen the end
users’ burden of software upgrade by installing CRAFT proxies in
the customer’s access network. The proxies then can process and
forward all capabilities and pre-capabilities on the users’ behalf.
Applications. Applications that use a non-TCP transport protocol
can still be made compliant with CRAFT. When a UDP ﬂow wants
to send at a rate less than its CRAFT rate, all packets associated
with that ﬂow are sent as CRAFT packets. When such UDP ﬂow
wants to exceed its CRAFT rate, it selects the less important pack-
ets and sends them as best-effort (i.e. using the legacy portion of
CRAFT links), so that the packets that are important are sent with
higher priority at no more than the CRAFT rate.
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